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Economic reforms in socialist and former socialist countries have required grassroots to
undergo fundamental and drastic changes in the basic conditions of work and family
life. Amid the rapid transition from the socialist collective economy to the market-ori -
ented private economy, people in increasing numbers have been trapped in a deadlock
situation where they are neither materially protected by the socialist arrangements for
unconditional employment and subsistence, nor functionally integrated into the new
system of market-based division of labor and commodity exchange. In rural China, this
dilemma seems especially problematic for those people who live in families without suf -
ficient political influence or production assets, who are women or live in woman-headed
households, and who do not have sufficient luck, courage, or talent to transform them -
selves into successful migrant entrepreneurs. The emergence of the economic disadvan -
tages suffered by these groups has been structurally linked to the reactivation of the
peasant family as an independent, private economic unit for whose economic activities
the state neither exercises direct institutional control nor assumes political responsibili -
ty.
INTRODUCTION
It is no surprise that the re e m e rgence of the peasant private economy,
family-based and market-oriented in most cases, has inevitably engendered
various patterns of inequality in rural China. However, the concrete nature
of socioeconomic stratification cannot be understood under a simplistic
equation of economic privatism with inequality. The newly emerging pat-
terns of inequality reflect the cultural, institutional as well as political frame-
works in which Chinese rural population carry on their private venture s .
Since peasants tend to rely on their family as a corporate org a n i z a t i o n a l
entity in material production and protection, its cultural, institutional, and
political attributes are closely related to the new patterns of inequality.
First, the peasant household or family has become the core unit of
inequality in rural China. Rural decollectivization led to the demise of the
need-based distribution system (jiatingrenkou fenpei) which used to ensure a
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high level of intra-collective equality among member households. While the
c u r rent household responsibility system (da baogan) maintains land alloca-
tion according to the size of each household (i.e., the number of mouths to
feed), the ultimate economic outcomes depend on varying levels of efforts,
wisdom, and sometimes political connections of diff e rent households. In
contrast to the pre-reform era when serious levels of inter-collective (among
d i ff e rent teams, brigades, and communes) inequality were pro n o u n c e d ,
rural reform may be characterized as a process by which the elementary
unit of inequality devolved from the collective to the household. (As point-
ed out below, this does not necessarily mean that inter-collective inequality
has been decreasing in the reform era or that each collective unit in the pre-
reform era fulfilled thorough inter-household equality.) Inter- c o l l e c t i v e
inequality in the pre-reform era was caused by each collective unit’s varying
endowments of land quality, infrastructure, urban adjacency, etc. (see Lyons,
1991; Wa l k e r, 1989; Lard y, 1983). Then the big question is what kinds of
household characteristics and conditions determine the disparate economic
status of each rural family?
Second, the cultural practice of gender division of labor within the (patri-
a rchal) peasant family seems to be rapidly reappearing. Peasants’ familial
entrepreneurship in the reform era was not invented from any administra-
tive or technical programs of the government but evolved out the social and
cultural norms of peasant life. Although the traditional patriarchal gender
relations were put under ideological attack during the early years of social-
ist transition, peasant domestic norms including gender relations were not
u p rooted thoroughly but ignored casually. When peasant families were
allowed to resume various economic activities, patriarchal gender relations
were used as one of the core organizational rules. Diversification into indus-
trial and service sectors, investment in human capital formation (i.e., educa-
tion), and even selection of the next child’s sex have been favorable to
males. Conversely, females have been concentrated in unpromising agricul-
ture, unrewarding household work, and unlucky abortion and school drop-
out.
T h i rd, as the responsibility for economically absorbing and pro t e c t i n g
rural population devolved from the state-controlled collective down to the
private family, state expenditure on social and economic matters was fur-
ther concentrated in the urban economy and society. Rural decollectiviza-
tion served as a deceptive process of relinquishing the state burden for sus-
taining and improving the material welfare of peasants to private families.
At the same time, however, public spending on urban workers’ stable
employment, income, and welfare increased almost explosively, so that their
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lead over peasants in the material living standard kept expanding in spite of
the chronic stagnation and deficit of their employer enterprises. The disap-
pointing pace of urban reform ironically meant the continuing economic
protection of urban workers in state enterprises by the state.
In delineating these new patterns of inequality among diff e rent peasant
families, between rural men and women, and between rural and urban resi-
dents in the reform era, we should not automatically assume that the social
and economic relations among these groups had been completely or even
satisfactorily equal in the pre-reform era. As the family was at least the basic
unit of rural distribution and consumption, its demographic composition
and its members’ work efforts did effect some marginal variation in eco-
nomic well-being (Parish and Whyte, 1978). Also, revolution or liberation of
Chinese women’s status is argued to have been “postponed” in social, eco-
nomic as well as political domains under the collusion between the patriar-
chal state and patriarchal communities and families (Wolf, 1985). Rural-
urban disparity was structurally reproduced and expanded through many
biased state policies such as the unfavorably priced pro c u rement of farm
p roducts, the scanty public investment in agriculture, and the minimal
spending on rural collective welfare. However, these kinds of systematic
discriminations were not seriously felt by the concerned disadvantaged
g roups so as to critically destabilize the socialist rule. Ultimately, r u r a l
decollectivization came to annul the institutional preconditions for such pat-
terns of inequality and instead put the family in the locus of new patterns of
inequality.
The existence of inequality among diff e rent peasant families, between
rural men and women, between rural and urban residents in the Maoist era
does not fully legitimate the recent increases of inequality concerning the
same social groups in the post-Mao era. Just as Mao Zedong had needed to
publicly point out such elements of inequality and argue for continuous rev-
olutionary struggle to overcome them, Deng Xiaoping to acknowledge the
newly growing patterns of inequality and relatedly proposed his
“xianfulun” (argument on getting rich early) to persuade grassroots people
and cadres in this regard. As early as 1978, Deng (1983: 142) remarked, “it
should be accepted that certain areas, enterprises, workers, and peasants
attain high income and affluent life through industrious attitude and eff i-
cient management”. In the subsequent reform process, however, Deng’s
bold position was overshadowed by political concerns linked to many seri-
ous trends of inequality. After the Tiananmen incident in June 1989, Deng
(1993: 374) had to reiterate his emphasis to pacify worries about setback in
reform by saying, in his famous nanxunjianghua (southern round lecture ) ,
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“areas which develop first (thanks to favorable conditions) will lead unde-
veloped areas and ultimately prosper together”. The same relationship, in
his view, must exist among any social groups or economic segments among
which material inequality is currently increasing.1
In Deng’s vision, reform inevitably makes certain industrious and capable
groups (or individuals) attain high income and affluent life ahead of other
g roups (or individuals), but the efforts of these leading groups will ulti-
mately benefit the remaining groups (or individuals). Peasants’ responses to
this proposition have been somewhat contradictory in that most of them
willingly accept new patterns of inequality at an abstract social level but bit-
terly resent their personal disparities and disadvantages. As subsequently
analyzed in this paper, the current material disadvantages of households
without sufficient political influence or production assets, women and
woman-headed households, and even the entire rural population (vis-a-vis
the urban worker population) do not seem to have any self-corrective mech-
anisms that will ensure an ultimate “trickle-down” of wealth. 
In this paper, the new patterns of inequality among different peasant fam-
ilies, between rural men and women, and between rural and urban re s i-
dents in the early reform era are documented and explained on the basis of
statistical and other analyses. For statistical documentation, I use the panel
survey data collected at Dahe People’s Commune/Township, Huolu
County, Hebei Province in 1979-80 and 1986 (see Putterman, 1989), the rural
survey data collected in four provinces (Jiangsu, Hebei, Hubei, and
Guizhou) across China in 1988-89 by a special research team of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (see Yu Dechang, 1992) as well as various state-
compiled statistics on national social and economic conditions. In addition,
the outcomes produced by the empirical analyses of the concerned inequali-
ties by both Chinese and foreign (mostly Western) scholars are incorporated
where appropriate.
TRENDS OF RURAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE REFORM ERA
One of the highly peculiar aspects of post-Mao rural reform is that the
decollectivization, or privatization, of the rural economy was immediately
accompanied not only by a quick improvement in agricultural productivity
and peasant income but also by a substantial decrease in income inequality.
Institutional measures for undoing the socialist rural production system
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1Economic and social inequality has become one of the core subjects of research by Chinese
sociologists and economists in the reform era. See Li (1993), Zhao, Ji, and Ge, eds. (1994), etc.
came to generate another “growth with equity” model of development. As a
consequence, almost all Chinese villagers quickly became sincere political
supporters (as well as economic beneficiaries) of Deng’s liberal economic
reform. Needless to say, this seemingly counter-intuitive trend was some-
thing the Communist leadership in Beijing could have only dreamed of.
However, this double blessing soon turned into a double jeopardy from the
mid 1980s when both agricultural productivity and income equality began
to deteriorate despite (or rather because of) alternative economic growth in
rural industries.
The World Bank once computed China’s GINI coefficients between 1980
and 1986 as 0.26, 0.23, 0.22, 0.25, 0.27, 0.30, 0.31.2 Richard Barrett presented
rural GINI coefficients between 1980 and 1988 as 0.286, 0.268, 0.261, 0.267,
0.275, 0.293, 0.307, 0.315, 0.364.3 The inequality reduction between 1980-
1982, a period in which most of the crucial measures for agricultural decol-
lectivization were implemented, could be explained, in part, by the fact that
land allocation to individual households was usually based the household
size — or the number of mouths to be fed in each household — and thus
constituted another line of egalitarian economic policy. In addition, as I ana-
lyzed elsewhere, local communities like Dahe tried to implement re f o r m
measures in flexible ways that might strengthen the egalitarian security of
local villagers’ material livelihood (Chang, 1994). The inequality upturn
since 1983 seems to bring serious attention to the conditions and conse-
quences of rural industrial development. Unlike agricultural decollectiviza-
tion, rural industrialization was not initiated as a conscious society-wide
policy program but evolved out of voluntary efforts by local peasants and
c a d res as well as the varying economic conditions of diff e rent localities
(Zhou, 1996). Therefore, peasants’ income growth, based upon rural indus-
trial development since the mid 1980s, was much more likely to involve
enlarged inequality.4
Such possibility is systematically documented in a study by Kahn and his
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2As cited in Kahn et al. (1992).
3These are data presented by Prof. Richard Barrett at a colloquium in Department of
Sociology, Seoul National University in 1992, under the title “Effects of China’s New
Economic Policy on Income Distribution in Urban and Rural Areas”.
4Income growth in a society can be generated within existing economic sectors (intra-sec-
toral income growth) and across different economic sectors (inter-sectoral income growth).
Chang and Shin (1989) showed that these two processes of income growth represent mutually
distinct phenomena with separate sets of determinants. In reform-era rural China, the former
was more important in the early 1980s, whereas the latter was more important since the mid
1980s. In the latter process, as was the case in rural China, income inequality between those
moving into higher-paying sectors and those remaining in current sectors was indispensable.
colleagues (Kahn et al., 1992). Based upon a survey of 10,258 rural house-
holds across China in 1988, their study revealed that newer income sources
were distributed more unequally. That is, the GINI coefficient was 0.338 for
the total household income; 0.436 for cash income; 0.710 for individual
income; 0.487 for non-wage firm income; and 0.484 for property income.
Among these components of rural income, cash income (usually from sell-
ing agricultural and nonagricultural produce in local markets) accounted
for 33.1 percent of the total household income and determined 42.6 percent
of the total household income inequality. Individual income (usually from
selling labor in rural enterprises) accounted for only 8.7 percent of the total
household income, but determined 18.3 percent of the total household
income inequality. The commercialization and deagriculturalization of the
peasant economy came to lead the economic inequality trend among
Chinese peasants since the mid 1980s. Based upon another nation-wide sur-
vey of 7,998 rural households (and 6,962 urban households), Chinese schol-
ars based in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Li, Zhao, and Zhang,
1998) affirm that such has been increasingly the case well into the 1990s.
They estimated GINI coefficients for the total income, 0.338 in 1988 and
0.429 in 1995; for household management income (including agricultural
income), 0.282 in 1988 and 0.286 in 1995; for individual wage income, 0.710
in 1988 and 0.745 in 1995; and for property income (including intere s t s ) ,
0.484 in 1988 and 0.558 in 1995.
This inequality trend concurs with the rapidly changing distribution of
rural households across diff e rent income categories shown in Table 1.
Between 1980 and 1985, the peasant population experienced an almost uni-
versal and highly equitable growth in their average income. Roughly speak-
ing, everyone enjoyed an income increase about 100 yuan while a small
minority of peasants began to earn more than ten times that of poor neigh-
bors’ income. Since then, income growth took place much more unevenly, so
that peasant households became more and more dispersed across different
income categories. In the 1990s, however, another trend of income equaliza-
tion seems to have been put into effect, perhaps reflecting the deceleration
of rural industrial growth in many parts of China.5 Regardless of the overall
extent of rural income inequality, what deserves enormous attention was
that the proportion of extreme poverty-stricken peasants declined to an
almost insignificant level by the mid 1980s.
The degree and pattern of rural income inequality varied substantially
among different regions. Table 2 shows that income inequality was far less
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p ronounced in Guizhou (Wangmo Xian), one of the poorest provinces in
China, than in Jiangsu, Hebei, and Hubei. Although the income categories
over 5,000 yuan in this table are two wide to show the income distribution
in Jiangsu with comparable details, Jiangsu peasants’ earnings were notably
more widespread than those of Hebei and Hubei, not to mention Guizhou.
Guizhou’s poverty, it seems, was mainly due to its failure to develop rural
industry, whereas the opposite was the case for Jiangsu. An analytical con-
clusion is that rural industrial development not only determined inter-
regional economic disparity but also shaped the pattern of intra-re g i o n a l
income distribution.
INTER-HOUSEHOLD STRATIFICATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Given the overall trends and patterns of rural economic inequality, what
types of specific characteristics are responsible for the relative prosperity or
poverty of each peasant household? This question pertains to the funda-
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TABLE 1. CHANGES IN INCOMES AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS
BY PER CAPITA INCOME 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
Surveyed cases 15,914 66,642 66,960 67,340 
Per person income (yuan)
Total 216.22 547.31 990.38 2337.87 
Net 191.33 397.60 686.31 1577.74 
Cash 113.12 357.39 676.67 1595.56 
Distribution by income level (%)
0-100 9.80 .96 .22 .22 
100-200 51.80 11.26 1.80 .38 
200-300 25.30 25.61 6.57 .81 
300-400 8.60 24.00 11.99 1.55 
400-500 2.90 15.85 14.37 2.40 
500-600 9.06 13.99 3.70 
600-800 8.02 20.83 9.59 
800-1000 1.60 2.93 12.45 11.58 
1000-1500 1.89 12.20 26.60 
1500-2000 0.26 3.47 17.25
2000- 0.16 2.11 25.92  
General retail price index 108.1 128.1 207.7 356.1 
(1978=100)
Source: Abridged from ZGTJNJ 1997, p. 312; retail price index from ZGTJNJ 1997, p. 267.
mental nature of the post-collective economic transition in rural China. If it
was a transition to largely unfettered economic privatism, various function-
al characteristics of each peasant household such as labor power, productive
assets, and technical expertise may have determined its material well-being.
If it was a transition to still politically manipulated privatism, those peasant
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TABLE 2. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS BY TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME
IN FOUR PROVINCES 
Total income Jiangsu Hebei Hubei Guizhou All
(yuan) (Wu) (Guan) (Zhongxiang) (Wangmo)
Cases 100 100 100 100 400
0-200 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3
201-400 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.3
401-600 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.0 1.8
601-800 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.0 1.8
801-1000 0.0 1.0 1.0 9.0 2.8
1001-2000 1.0 12.0 18.0 40.0 17.8 
2001-3000 1.0 28.0 28.0 20.0 19.3
3001-4000 12.0 28.0 12.0 8.0 15.0
4001-5000 11.0 10.0 19.0 2.0 10.5
5001-10000 42.0 18.0 18.0 1.0 19.8
10001- 33.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 10.0
TABLE 3. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL FAMILIES BY PER HOUSEHOLD AND PER
CAPITA TOTAL ANNUAL LIVING EXPENSES IN FOUR PROVINCES 
Jiangsu Hebei Hubei Guizhou All
Total living (Wu) (Guan) (Zhongxiang) (Wangmo)
expenses (in
yuan) p.h./p.c. p.h./p.c. p.h./p.c. p.h./p.c. p.h./p.c.
Cases 100 100 100 100 400
0-199 0 0 0 43 0 51 14 91 3.5 46.3
200-399 0 16 3 51 8 36 26 6 9.3 27.3
400-599 0 18 8 3 13 7 21 2 10.5 7.6
600-799 1 15 24 1 17 3 20 1 15.5 5.0
800-899 2 19 26 1 23 0 7 0 14.5 5.1
1000-1199 6 32a 21 1a 14 3a 5 0a 11.5 9.1a
1200-1399 4 10 6 1 5.3
1400-1599 5 5 7 3 5.0
1600-1799 7 1 3 1 3.0
1800- 75 2 9 2 22.0
a1000 yuan and over.
households with strategic sociopolitical assets such as having a cadre in the
family or strong connections with cadres may also have enjoyed advantages
in becoming affluent. On the part of the Communist leadership in Beijing,
the latter situation would be much more difficult to justify.
Table 4 paints a somewhat mixed picture about the nature of post-collec-
tive peasant society in China. Among those peasant households in Jiangsu,
Hebei, Hubei, and Guizhou surveyed in 1989, the total household income
was positively associated with household size, household age structure (the
p roportion of working-aged members), and amount of productive assets.
These are typical household characteristics thought to constitute the so-
called production inputs. (Cultivated land size is another core input in agri-
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TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURAL, NONAGRICULTURAL, AND TOTAL
INCOME IN FOUR PROVINCES (1989)
Total income Agro income Nonagro income 
Independent variablea Unstandardized Unstandardized Unstandardized 
OLS coefficient OLS coefficient OLS coefficient 
(n=398) (n=398) (n=398) 
Cadre household 802.2 697.5* 289.1 
Expert household -72.0 -90.5 77.7 
Household size 405.8** -40.9 172.6 
Educated proportion -1113.4 -426.9 -211.8
Male proportion 649.4 678.1 -130.7 
Working-age proportion 3063.2** 949.3+ 1297.2 
Strong labor proportion -833.3 588.8 -1515.1+ 
Total productive assets .1377***
Agro assets -.1147  
Nonagro assets .1278*** 
Total workhours -.0016
Agro workhours .6243***
Nonagro workhours .0557 
Jiangsu 3860.2*** 892.3** 3010.5*** 
Hubei -390.9 109.4 -829.3+ 
Guizhou -2808.6*** -1548.2*** -2102.4*** 
Constant 564.9 -980.4 1998.7 
Adjusted R-square .4353*** .2265*** .4492*** 
+p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
aExpert household is a household whose member(s) has special skills; educated proportion is the
proportion of household memberswith high-school or college education; working-age proportion is
the proportion of household members aged 16 to 60; strong labor proportion is the proportion of
household members with strong laboring capacity; the reference area for area dummy variables is
Hebei.
cultural production, but the strictly egalitarian distribution of land accord-
ing to household size makes land size an already saturated variable.)
C o n s e q u e n t l y, as far as the total household income is concerned, the
Communist leadership does not have to worry about any political contami-
nation of rural economic reform. However, if agricultural and nonagricul-
tural incomes are considered separately, the situation is much more com-
plex.
Concerning agricultural income, cadre households as well as households
which had bigger proportions of working-aged members and whose mem-
bers worked longer hours were able to earn significantly more. As farming
in China was still a primitive industry predominantly based upon labor
input, the importance of the proportion of working-aged members and the
total workhours, as opposed to the insignificance of agricultural production
assets, is quite understandable. This situation does not fundamentally differ
from the collective era when the labor endowments and workhours of each
household directly determined workpoints (gongfen) for grain distribution.
The proportion of male members in the household was not a significant fac-
tor for agricultural income (nor for nonagricultural income). As subsequent-
ly discussed in this paper, women have become a core workforce in agricul-
ture and thereby allowed men’s active participation in nonagricultural pro-
duction activities. The importance of having a cadre in the family seems to
attest to the continuation of rural cadres’ pre rogative in (ab)using their
political status to accumulate wealth. Rural cadres may have allocated more
fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favor-
able grain sales quotas for themselves. (If market prices were higher than
state pro c u rement prices, they may have reduced their own quotas; if the
opposite was the case, they may have increased their own quotas.) By con-
trast, having a professional of any sort or a larger proportion of highly edu-
cated family members did not benefit (primitive) agricultural production.
Concerning nonagricultural income, cadre households did not have the
same strategic advantage as those concerning agricultural income. While
many rural enterprises were run collectively under the leadership or inter-
vention of local cadres, they could not (or did not?) translate their political
power into nonagricultural income advantages.6 Labor endowments of each
household, whether in terms of household size, proportion of working-age
members, or proportion of physically strong members, did not significantly
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affect nonagricultural income, either. There was even a weak negative asso-
ciation between the amount of nonagricultural income and the proportion
of physically strong family members, which perhaps should be interpreted
as an inertia effect of strong family labor power against new economic activ-
ities. But the amount of nonagricultural production assets were stro n g l y
responsible for the chance of earning more nonagricultural income.
Nonagricultural production activities, ranging from peddling to manufac-
turing, seem to have required significant amounts of capital for preparing
tools, equipments, workshops, etc. Since those households which earned
larger amounts of nonagricultural (and, for that matter, agricultural) income
could have pre p a red more production assets for nonagricultural pro d u c-
tion, the mechanism for economic re p roduction on successively expanded
scales seems to have been put in motion. However, their nonagricultural
activities were not advanced enough to fully benefit those families whose
members were highly educated or had professional qualifications.7
In sum, there existed mutually distinct dynamics of material gain in agri-
cultural and nonagricultural production activities in post-Mao rural China.
M o re agricultural income could be won by expanding laboring hours or
having more working-aged members (vis-a-vis elderly and children), on the
one hand, and by relying on the political advantage of being a cadre family,
on the other hand. In contrast, more nonagricultural income could be won
by having more production assets. Thus, the sustained trend of rapid rural
industrialization constituted a fundamental transformation of sociopolitical
as well as economic order in rural China. With nonagricultural sectors bloat-
ing, rural China gradually became a society where money makes more
money.
It is not an unusual phenomenon that Chinese rural households making
larger income spend more on living. In Table 5, the amount of living expens-
es among rural households was strongly determined by their total income.
Besides, Jiangsu’s peasant families tended to spend on living beyond their
income constraint. Consumption propensity, as measured by the proportion
of living expenses out of the total income, was particularly notable among
families with cadre and with large productive assets. Perhaps, these two
types of families respectively had political and economic leverages for sta-
ble income and thus could aff o rd liberal spending habits. However, con-
sumption propensity had a strong negative relationship to total income,
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sively into new commercial or industrial activities.
implying that high income earning families were able to make extra savings
or business investment after their consumption needs were satisfied to a
certain extent. In addition, rural families of particularly rich and poor areas
were more conspicuous in consumption propensity, albeit, for opposite rea-
sons. Guizhou’s families spent most of their income just to satisfy the very
basic consumption needs, whereas Jiangsu’s families enjoyed abundant sur-
plus income for luxury consumption. The latter finding does not have to
contradict the overall inverse relationship between total income and con-
sumption propensity because the economic situation of Jiangsu’s rural fami-
lies was at an extreme. The amount of living expenses itself does not consti-
tute the ultimate quality of life. But, in a society like rural China where even
primitive consumption goods had been in chronic shortage for decades, the
amount of living expenses is an unmistakable indicator of gratification (and
thus of inequality).
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF THE AMOUNT AND PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLD LIVING
EXPENSES IN FOUR PROVINCES (1989)
Amount Proportion 
Independent variablea Unstandardized OLS coefficient Unstandardized OLS coefficient
(n=398) (n=398)
Cadre household 22.4 .0690* 
Expert household -70.7 -.0287 
Household size 7.5 -.0049 
Educated proportion 19.2 .0134 
Male proportion 341.1 .0667 
Working-age proportion 585.6+ .0463 
Strong labor proportion -182.7 .0198 
Total productive assets .0165 .0000* 
Total workhours .0175 .0000




Constant -205.2 .4047*** 
Adjusted R-square .5585*** .2663*** 
+p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
aExpert household is a household whose member(s) has special skills; educated proportion is the
proportion of household memberswith high-school or college education; working-age proportion is 
the proportion of household members aged 16 to 60; strong labor proportion is the proportion of
household members with strong laboring capacity; the reference for area dummy variables is Hebei.
RURAL WOMEN
P a t r i a rchal Family, Patriarchal Market Family economy and market, the
two pillars of rural reform, have a common patriarchal attribute in organiz-
ing economic activities and legitimating them culturally. The logic of liberal
economic restructuring implicitly proposes that women’s equal entitlement
to social employment and wage, a socialist principle advocated for decades,
is not necessarily compatible with macro-economic eff i c i e n c y. Once dis-
charged into local communities and families, women’s trouble is aggravated
as they are now subjected to resuscitated habits and ideologies for gender
segregation and thus unfavorably treated in newly available market-orient-
ed economic activities. Consequently, Chinese rural women’s socioeconomic
status is critically shaped by the interplay between patriarchal familism
embedded in the peasant household economy and patriarchal liberalism
embedded in the market economy.8
The social and cultural resources utilized in the process of revitalizing the
family as the core institution for rural production were not provided by the
political leadership in Beijing but spontaneously mobilized by grassro o t s
peasants from their collective memory of thousands-year-old agrarian life.9
As a result, the time-worn organizational principle of patriarchal division of
labor became restrengthened. This traditional division of labor is reflected
in a culturally colored logic of biological role separation, which is some-
times explained as zironfengong (natural division of work) by Chinese schol-
ars.10 Such conservative intellectual discourse concurs with grassroots peas-
ants’ interpretation of everyday social and economic realities. 
It should be noted that the Maoist policy of gender reform was seriously
limited in transforming grassroots family norms governing gender relations
and even incorporated them in to the propaganda of promoting familial
self-support in welfare provision. In Mao’s perspective, women’s subord i-
nation could be overcome by abolishing the exploitation of poor peasant
families by the landlord class in the pre-revolutionary era and by inducting
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provide comprehensive discussions on the gendered division of labor and politics in the
reform era.
9This does not imply that the state has been indifferent to the importance of such social and
cultural resources. As I explain elsewhere, the reformist regime — not unlike the Stalinist
(Maoist) regime in the collective era — has tried to achieve its urban-biased policy goals by
manipulating and abusing them (Chang, 2001).
10See Judd (1990) for local Chinese discourse on this issue.
women and men equally into the process of social production in collective
farms and collective and state enterprises in the post-revolutionary era. It
was basically an Engelsian — and, for that matter, Marxian — view of
emphasizing the primacy of the social relations of production over the cul-
tural norms and ideologies in the family as the core historical determinant
of women’s status.1 1 Under the nation-wide socialist transition of pro d u c-
tion organizations, the domestic gender relations were presumed to change
in a desirable direction even without a sustained interventionist political
work into the family.12 Furthermore, there was even a sort of pro-patriarchal
family campaign in the early 1960s when economic and social privatism
was implicitly ratified as a tool for recovering from the debacles of the Great
Leap Forward. The wuhao jiating (five good family) campaign encouraged
women to manage households wisely, to assist and cooperate with neigh-
bors, to support husbands’ hard work and study, to raise children well, and
to study hard themselves. When farmwork went through the sequential
measures of decollectivization from the late 1970s, peasant families did not
have much trouble reorganizing agricultural and other production around
the patriarchal principles of role differentiation and work division.
Accordingly, rural decollectivization had different structural ramifications
for diff e rent gender groups. Men and women experienced a fundamental
social transformation from the common status of collective farm workers
into the gender-based dissimilar statuses of family farm head and
wife/daughter-in-law, respectively. In addition, the simultaneous demise of
rural collective welfare programs (as explained in detail in Chang, 1993)
required women to intensify their role as social support provider for family
members such as aged parents-in-law and children.
Women’s status in the patriarchal peasant family is more incorporated
than unshackled by the rapidly expanding market economy. Of course,
there is no inherent theoretical attribute in the market economy to cause or
exacerbate gender inequality. If the market economy deals with men and
women strictly according to their comparative advantages of labor and lev-
els of human capital, some women may gain chances to overcome their pre-
reform disadvantages in job appointment and promotion, work allocation,
and remuneration.13 However, the realities of reform-era China have shown
not only the continuation of most of these pr e - reform disadvantages of
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11See Frederick Engels ([1884]1942), The Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State: In the
Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan, New York: International Publishers.
12K. Johnson (1983) discusses historical details on this strategy.
13Furthermore, a group of (Chinese-style) feminist scholars advocate the market economy
because it supposedly helps dismantle women’s preoccupation in family life, dependent men-
women but also the theoretical justification of the existing gender inequality
and segregation in terms of the dif f e rent comparative advantages of
women’s and men’s labor, reflecting a distorted influence of Western liberal
economics. Such gender-discriminatory conventions, norms and theories
are readily accepted, in particular, because of the demographic problem of
c h ronic oversupply of labor in rural China. When almost all jobs can be
filled by men alone — i.e., without using women’s labor — families and
employers tend to accept any excuses, theories, or norms justifying men’s
preferential economic participation.
Trends of Gender-based Economic Differentiation
The practical economic consequences of these collective ideas in ru r a l
China can be summarized as men’s disproportionate participation in nona-
gricultural sectors, sustained feminization of agricultural labor, and increase
of unemployed or economically inactive women. Meng Xianfan (1996: 78), a
local Chinese scholar, observes, “[t]he new division of labor in which ‘men
in nonagricultural occupations and women on the land’ has turned women
into the main force in agricultural production.” However, agriculture is not
a prestigious or pleasant occupation among peasants themselves; nor does it
constitute the main dynamic of rural or national development in re c e n t
years. While agriculture continues to suffer from insufficient state invest-
ment, low pro f i t a b i l i t y, and primitive working conditions, rural women,
married ones in particular, are politically encouraged to maximize their role
as the core workforce in agricultural production. In this context, the famous
Maoist slogan of “women buttress half the sky” is now being replaced with
an even stronger one of “women buttress two-thirds of the sky” (Xiao,
1995).
Census figures in Table 6 show that nine out of ten women residing in
rural counties were engaged in farming or other primary labor throughout
the 1980s. Men’s labor was also concentrated in primary sectors, but their
participation in industrial production, professional/technical work, public
service, and commerce was much more frequent than that of women. In
towns, however, such gender disparities were much less salient. This was
perhaps because jobs in towns were largely new and more likely to be allo-
cated by market criteria and objective credentials.
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tality, and passive attitude, and instead promotes desirable individual attributes such as
material achievement, fair competition, entrepreneurship, and individual creativity, and nec-
essary social attitudes such as social responsibility, cooperation, and respect for public inter-
ests. See Yan and Cao (1995).
Women’s concentration in agriculture is conversely responsible for their
relatively weak participation in rural industry, in particular, in poor regions.
As shown in Table 7, women accounted for only 33.0 percent of the total
labor employed in township and village enterprises across China in 1995. In
Jiangsu, a relatively rich province with a particularly notable rural industri-
al growth, women’s proportion was as high as 43.4 percent; whereas in
Guizhou, a poverty-stricken, predominantly agricultural inland pro v i n c e ,
women’s proportion was only 16.7 percent.14 While women’s concentration
in agriculture (or relative exclusion from rural industry) is widespre a d
nationally, it is particularly serious in poor areas where rural industry is also
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TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF LABOR BY GENDER IN 1982 AND 1990
(CENSUS)
Counties Towns Cities 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1982 Census
Total (10000) 22776 17942 1965 1293 4625 3549
Prof./tech. 4.1 2.0 11.8 15.3 10.1 13.0
Officials 1.2 0.1 8.7 1.4 6.3 1.5
Office labor 0.7 0.1 6.9 2.9 4.9 3.0
Commerce labor 1.1 0.7 5.2 9.3 3.3 5.4
Service labor 1.1 0.6 5.8 9.1 5.2 9.0
Primary labor 81.9 91.0 17.5 23.1 21.0 26.6
Industry labor 9.9 5.5 43.9 38.6 48.9 41.3
Other  0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1990 Census
Total (1000) 26148 21931 2654 1853 6807 5325
Prof./tech. 2.9 1.6 14.8 19.5 10.7 15.7
Officials 1.2 0.1 8.4 1.3 7.0 1.7
Office labor 0.7 0.1 9.3 3.6 5.7 3.5
Commerce labor 1.5 1.0 9.3 14.7 5.9 7.9
Service labor 1.0 0.7 5.8 9.2 5.0 8.9
Primary labor 83.6 91.4 13.8 17.4 22.9 29.0
Industry labor 9.1 5.0 38.6 34.3 42.7 33.3
Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: Calculated based upon data in ZG1982RKPC, pp.428-31, and ZG1990RKPC10%, pp. 289-352.
14Relatedly, a local study revealed the following: in areas where rural industry is prosper-
ing, married women stay in villages and perform wage labor and housework simultaneously;
in areas where rural industry is not developed, many unmarried women leave for cities; and
in underdeveloped inland areas, men depart for cities leaving agriculture work in the hands
of women. See Meng X. (1994).
less developed. The more scarce economic opportunities are, the worse gen-
der inequalities become.
The case of Dahe Township in Table 8 shows that women’s economic sub-
o rdination was apparently intensified between 1979 and 1985, a period
when most of the crucial measures of rural reform were taken. Wo m e n ’ s
participation in rural industry increased little, whereas many women gave
up production work for homemaking or retirement.15 Women’s homemak-
ing work became more demanding as a result of the demise of collective
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TABLE 7. WOMEN WORKERS OF TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ENTERPRISES IN 1995
All workers Women % Women
China 60604319 20010712 33.0
Jiangsu 6684390 2902655 43.4
Hebei 2894210 816651 28.2
Hubei 3020730 900480 29.8
Guizhou 320794 53533 16.7
Source: Calculated from ZGXZQYNJ 1996, p. 244.
TABLE 8. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION BY GENDER AT DAHE IN 1979 AND 1985a
Occupation Men (%) Women (%) 
1979
Student  40 (9.8) 27 (6.4)
Team member (farming) 239 (58.7) 357 (84.6) 
Worker (industry) 75 (18.4) 22 (5.2)
Teacher  11 (2.7) 6 (1.4)
Team and brigade cadre 31 (7.6) 9 (2.1)
Commune and state cadre 11 (2.7) 1 (0.2)
1985
Student  2 (0.6) 1 (0.4)
Primary (farming, etc.) 79 (25.5) 136 (53.4)
Rural collective enterprise 102 (33.1) 25 (9.9)
Tertiaryb 58 (18.7) 4 (1.6)
Teacher  1 (0.3) 0 (0.0)
Homemaking/Retired 22 (7.1) 73 (28.7)
Other 45 (14.6) 15 (5.9)
aAmong those aged 15 years and over.
bPrivate operation or laboring in transportation, construction, commerce, and foods.
1 5This trend has been pervasive throughout China. Even in villages near Shenzhen,
Guangdong Province, according to a survey of 1992, at least about one third of the working-
age women were primarily home-makers (Zhe, 1997: 320).
welfare and social service programs, whereas the exchange value ideology
systematically underplays women’s contribution at home. By contrast, rural
industrial growth mostly helped men to get new jobs, of course, with better
income. Those women who did not clarify their occupation in 1985 may
well have been engaged in familial farmwork and/or homemaking which
did not provide them with a distinct occupational conception.
It is revealed in Table 9 that Dahe’s women were disadvantaged in vari-
ous remuneration and support categories, let alone their exclusion fro m
dynamic occupations. Except for special rewards (many of which may have
been specifically for women like a family planning re w a rd), men made
more in collective compensation, individual salary, collective subsidies, and
nonagricultural income. The gender difference was most notable in nonagri-
cultural income. Reflecting both occupational and remunerative disadvan-
tages, as shown in Table 10, woman-headed households at Dahe had to suf-
fer vast diff e rences in household income behind man-headed ones. The
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TABLE 9. AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL INCOME BY GENDER AT DAHE IN 1985a
Income item Men’s average Women’s average
(reporters) (reporters)
Workpoints (annual) 374.7 (297) 311.4 (257)
Workpoints value (annual) 261.4 (185) 208.0 (179)
Salary (monthly)  47.5 (50) 39.0 (5)
Subsidies (monthly)  13.5 (19) 12.1 (14)
Special subsidies (annual) 171.8 (91) 98.8 (15)
Rewards (annual)  76.2 (35) 118.1 (7)
Personal funds  382.0 (351) 235.2 (263)
Average wage (daily)  4.8 (150) 2.6 (21)
Nonagr. income (annual) 1564.2 (163) 882.8 (30)
aUnit is yuan except workpoints.
TABLE 10. AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD ANNUAL INCOME OF MAN-HEADED AND WOMAN-
HEADED FAMILIES AT DAHE IN 1985 (yuan)
Income item Man-headed Woman-headed 
(n=188) (n=55) 
Wage   135.0 183.8 
Sideline income  270.2 220.0
Private plot income  137.1 117.7
Subsidies  75.0 20.9
Total household production income 1373.0 1059.3
Total household income 3679.4 2384.7
average total annual income of woman-headed families remained less than
t w o - t h i rds that of man-headed families. The economic disadvantages of
women and woman-headed households seem to have constituted a general
phenomenon in all regions over all subsequent years.
Women’s Torments Along Life Course
The structural gender discrimination resulting from the interplay between
p a t r i a rchal family and patriarchal market manifests itself throughout the
life course of average rural women. First, son preference has seriously inten-
sified as rural families became more and more conscious about the need for
sons not only in securing old-age support, but also in taking advantage of
newly available market-oriented economic opportunities. Son pre f e re n c e
has interacted with the strict family planning policy, leading to female-tar-
geted abortions, concealment, and even infanticides by peasant families
without a son (Chang, 1996). 
Second, many of those lucky rural girls who have escaped abortion and
infanticide still have to face various unfair treatments in their family, of
which deschooling is not the least important. School-age rural girls have
been forced to skip classes or drop out from schools as their parents, who do
not see much value in investing in their daughters’ education, want them to
help with familial farmwork, household chores, and baby-sitting (Meng, Li,
and Wu, 1996). According to the 1990 census data, as shown in Table 11 ,
about 60 percent or more of those non-schooling rural children aged 8 and
over were girls. Among girls aged over 10 (whose physical and intellectual
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TABLE 11. NUMBER, PROPORTION AND FEMALE PROPORTION OF RURAL
NONSCHOOLING CHILDREN AGED 6-14
No. of % nschool % nschool % nschool % girls
children among all among boys among girls among nschool 
total 2829980 20.4 16.7 24.4 57.6 
6 838578 56.1 54.4 58.0 49.4 
7 398582 25.6 23.1 28.4 53.0 
8 184000 10.8 8.4 13.3 59.3 
9 105825 7.4 5.1 9.8 64.1 
10 101965 6.7 4.4 9.3 66.5 
11 128279 8.5 5.5 11.6 66.5 
12 201434 13.6 9.2 18.4 65.3
13 328318 21.5 15.0 28.4 64.1
14 542999 33.6 25.2 42.5 61.3 
Source: Calculated based upon data in ZG1990RKPC10%, pp. 199-204.
g rowth was sufficient as auxiliary labor by peasants’ standard), the non-
schooling proportion increased dramatically year by year. Of course, boys
could not evade the educational divestment altogether, but their education
was obviously much more valued than girls’ education. Furthermore, these
census statistics seem to have underreported the extent of girls’ educational
disadvantage. A special nation-wide survey in 1990 revealed that about 83
percent of the 4.8 million non-schooling children aged 6 to 14 were girls.16
In the context of male-centered family and market structure, rural girls’ edu-
cation should be honored for the sake of girls’ own human development,
but such an educational philosophy may be too luxurious for both economi-
cally desperate and ambitious pare n t s .1 7 The consequence of rural girls’
educational divestment is not limited to their immediate sorrow from denial
to classes but involves their life-time social and economic disadvantages
accruing to educational underqualification.
Third, when girls reach ages at which they can contemplate or decide on
their life situations, many of them try to evade their ill fate in villages by
venturing into cities or marrying urban residents. Not many rural girls will
a p p reciate that their families do not challenge the gender- d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
economic environment but accommodate it to their further disadvantage at
home. Thus new employment opportunities in urban labor-intensive indus-
trial and tertiary sectors, however abusive and unstable the working condi-
tions therein are, have forcefully lured young rural women. As explained
below, marriage to an urban resident, or at least a resident of a richer vil-
lage, may be a more attractive option, but it takes much more than one’s
determination. A rural survey of Jiangsu in 1991 disclosed that 70 percent of
the agricultural workforce in 1991 were aged 45 years and older in a sharp
contrast to the situation in the late 1970s when those aged 45 years and less
accounted for 70 percent of the agricultural workforce.18 Most of the young
women pulled out of farming seem to have found jobs in nearby towns or
cities. In this proletarianization process, unfortunately, their status as
women and migrants tend to disadvantage them doubly, so that their life
situation in urban areas is not necessarily better than in villages. 
In poor provinces where nonagricultural jobs are scarce, there is a massive
outflow of brides to richer areas. For instance, as shown later in Table 9-5,
42 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
16Reported in Beijing Review (28 February - 6 March 1994, p. 12).
17According to Beijing Review (28 February - 6 March 1994, pp. 12-13), there emerged a spe-
cial program, called “The Bud Plan”, to encourage and support rural girls’ return to school in
poor areas under the sponsorship of the China Children and Teenagers Fund and a Hong
Kong-based benefactor.
18For more details, see Rai and Zhang (1994).
about 50 percent of Guizhou’s total inter-provincial outmigrants during the
1985-1990 period (officially 309,320 persons) were women who married out,
in many cases, for substantial amounts of bride price. By now, stories about
bride price-related disputes and abuse of women are widespread acro s s
Chinese society. An annoying ramification of poor rural women’s outmar-
riage for bride price is the sudden increase of teen-age girls’ premature mar-
riage. A nation-wide survey of 1986-87 revealed that the youngest age of
marriage in 1986 among those surveyed was 11 in Jiangsu, 12 in Shandong
and Tianjin, 13 in Jilin, Hebei, Fujian, Guizhou, and Anhui, and so on.19 The
current marriage law (see Table 7) stipulates that women should reach the
age of 20 years for marriage. Figures in Table 12 show that almost 9 percent
of the first-married women in Guizhou in 1990 were in (illegal) early mar-
riage. The corresponding figure for Jiangsu was only 0.71 percent. Poverty
— more precisely, the lack of income-earning opportunities — is the prime
factor for women’s early marriage. For some reasons that cannot be
explained here, the early marriage trend became substantially weakened
over the next five years.
Finally, the massive out-of-village flight of men and young women have
left the mission of farm production and household maintenance in the
hands of middle-aged women (Meng, 1994, 1996). As 1990 census results in
Table 13 show, at least about 95 percent of the rural women in each age cate-
gory from 45 were engaged in agricultural and other primary sectors.
Among rural men, the corresponding proportions for the age gr o u p s
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TABLE 12. TREND OF (ILLEGAL) EARLY MARRIAGE RATE
China Jiangsu Hebei Hubei Guizhou
1990
First married women 9293966 664989 432527 485618 172951
Married 19 and low at 237179 4713 7608 16534 15237
Early marriage rate (%) 2.55 0.71 1.76 3.40 8.81
1995 
First married women 8269935 425699 348089 333051 206776
Married at 19 and low 77419 1413 208 3238 6684
Early marriage rate (%) 0.94 0.33 0.06 0.97 3.23
Source: Compiled and computed from ZGJHSYNJ 1991, p.495, and ZGJHSYNJ 1991, p.466.
1 9The outcomes are based upon 7,258 cases in fourteen provinces(cities). See
Zhongguonongcunjiatingdiaochazu (Chinese Rural Family Survey Team), ed., 1993, Dangdai
zhongguo nongcun jiating: 14 sheng(shi) nongcun jiating xiezuo ziliao huibian ( C o n t e m p o r a r y
Chinese Rural Families: Cooperative Survey Data Compilation of Rural Families in 14
Provinces (Cities)). Beijing: Shehuikexuewenxianchubanshe.
between 20 and 49 remained at around or slightly over 80 percent. The pro-
portion of those rural men in their fifties did not exceed 90 per c e n t .
Although the absolute number of men in each category was larger than that
of women, this did not refute women’s gradual take-over of agriculture .
Even most of those rural women who were not covered in these census data
may have been engaged in primary sector labor and household work simul-
t a n e o u s l y. In many areas where nonagricultural employment for men
increased rapidly, women came to account for 80 to 90 percent of the total
agricultural labor force in the early 1990s (Rai and Zhang, 1994). Now the
project of “socialist modernization” of Chinese agriculture has to be led by
middle-aged women. In this context, the Chinese government initiated the
shuangxieshuangbi (simultaneously learning and competing) campaign for
promoting rural women’s maximum participation in production, overcom-
ing of illiteracy, and technical training.20 When many rural men and young
women depart for cities to undertake “dirty works” left unfulfilled by urban
residents, middle-aged rural women undertake drudgery in farming left
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TABLE 13. RURAL MEN’S AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN LABOR IN PRIMARY SECTORS
INCLUDING FARMING, FORESTRY, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, FISHERY
Men Women
All labor % primary All labor % primary 
Total 26148498 83.6 21931461 91.4
15-19 3196488 89.1 3406749 90.4
20-24 4501631 82.3 4239377 88.5
25-29 3613484 79.8 3256853 89.8
30-34 2910890 80.2 2482348 90.6
35-39 3100202 81.2 2714858 92.0
40-44 2336104 80.8 1957083 92.8
45-49 1806058 82.2 1395799 94.6
50-54 1603711 85.5 1061024 96.6
55-59 1356546 89.8 774051 98.0
60-64 921078 93.3 398759 98.0
65- 802305 94.1 244560 97.6
Source: Calculated based upon data in ZG1990RKPC10%, pp. 347-52.
20According to Zhongguo funubao (10 March 1989), the shuangxie shuangbi campaign was
adopted at a meeting between All China Women’s Federation and government officials on
March 8, 1989. Renmin ribao (7 March 1992) reported that about 120 million rural women par-
ticipated in this campaign between 1989 and early 1992. Among them, 90 million women
received general technical training, 12.5 million women took specialized technical training, 8
million women overcame illiteracy or semi-illiteracy, and 340 thousand women won special
technician certificates.
behind by their husbands, sons, and daughters.21
Comparison with Urban Women
In sum, the destabilization of grassroots people’s work and life in the
market transition of the socialist economy, compounded with the gender
bias in elite economic theory and in grassroots social custom, tends to cause
a rapid feminization of poverty and alienation. Rural women’s torments are
manifested all along their life-course from birth to middle age. 
There is an interesting contrast in the nature of socioeconomic transforma-
tion between rural and urban women. While the above symptoms of gen-
der-biased reform in the countryside are much less pronounced in the cities,
urban women are facing diff e rent types of discrimination. Managerial
reform in urban state-enterprises is geared to institutionalization of the
labor market, which in turn necessitates massive pay-cuts, temporary and
permanent lay-offs, and early retirements. As women are much more likely
to become targets of these measures, this reveals the fundamentally gender-
biased perspective of reformist political leaders and enterprise managers
who seem to analyze the Chinese economy much more overwomaned than
overmaned. Among Chinese people and intellectuals, this view has been
expressed in terms of funuhuijia or nuxinghuijia (women return home). This
phrase suggests that when husbands earn enough for their families’ living
— more precisely these days, when jobs are scarce even for men — their
wives should return or stay home to take care of household work.22
Common gender-discriminatory practices in urban enterprises include:
“some units do not like to re c ruit females and set higher standards for
female applicants”; “in optimal re s t ructuring, some female employees are
the first to become redundant”; “some enterprises make pregnant women
take unnecessarily long leave on less or no pay”; “some enterprises lower
the re t i rement age, especially for women”; “some enterprises neglect the
special protection women should receive during pregnancy, childbirth and
breast-feeding, and even use the excuse of protecting women to force them
to leave their jobs” (Liu, 1996:91). These practices are rather widely known
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21For the division of labor between peasant migrants and regular urban workers, see Zhou
(1996, Chapter 6).
22Such a conservative view is not as readily shared by women as by men. A 1990 survey of
workers in nine large enterprises in Tianjin revealed that 60.8 percent of women (31.2 percent
strongly) opposed the idea of nuxinghuijia, whereas 41.6 percent of men (13.8 percent strong-
ly) opposed it (Fan and Zhang, 1995: 144-46). Even those men accepting the idea of nuxinghui-
jia may have included the ones who were much more concerned about possible income loss in
their households than women’s rights.
across China, but women’s complaints fall short of constituting any mean-
ingful social or political pressure on managers and officials.
The rural-urban differences in women’s social and economic status do not
seem to attest to a better situation of urban women but constitutes another
manifestation of the gender-biased nature of post-socialist reform in China.
Some scholars argue that the rapid expansion of urban service sectors will
reinvigorate women’s economic participation (Li, 1988). However, it is yet
to be seen whether the growth of the urban service economy will seriously
differentiate urban and rural areas in terms of women’s economic segrega-
tion and subordination.23
RURAL-URBAN DISPARITIES
The Paradox and Its Causes
Perhaps the biggest paradox of Chinese reform lies in the ever expanding
material gap between peasants and urban workers. Throughout the reform
process, it is the rural economy that has triggered and sustained the truly
i m p ressive trend of rapid economic growth. In the early 1980s, peasants
actively responded to new agricultural policies of raising pro c u re m e n t
prices and devolving production responsibilities down to individual house-
holds and instantly achieved enormous improvement in agricultural pro-
ductivity; since the mid 1980s, peasants and their local governments
launched bold and shrewd projects in rural industrial and tertiary sectors
and lifted the entire national economy into a vibrant industrial power. In a
stark contrast, the urban economy, composed of state and collective enter-
prises mainly in heavy industrial sectors, continued to frustrate reformers in
Beijing with lagging productivity, expanding deficits, and resistant manage-
rial practices. The proportion of deficit-making urban enterprises has been
estimated from one-third (according to official reports) to two-thir d s
(according to critical foreign observers). Then, how did urban workers come
to benefit much more favorably than peasants from economic reforms?
In Table 14, the rural-urban gap in the per capita annual income increased
both in absolute and relative terms during the reform period. The same was
true of per capita annual consumption and per capita annual savings. In the
early reform period (when agricultural reform measures were implement-
ed), the rural-urban gap in these economic indicators decreased at least in
the relative term. This trend is quite understandable. Since the mid 1980s
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23Even for the rural economy, the growth of tertiary industries is expected to become the
primary source of additional employment in the coming years (Zhang, Du, and Li, 1992: 54-57).
(when urban industrial reform began to be implemented), however, the
rural-urban gap widened both in absolute and relative terms and such
widening was particularly accelerated around 1990. Urban industrial reform
was supposed to tackle various structural problems of urban state enterpris-
es by hardening budgetary and laboring conditions according to each pro-
duction unit’s performance in productivity and profit-making. Thus, if most
of the urban enterprises continued to show disappointingly low levels of
p roductivity and pro f i t a b i l i t y, their employees must have suff e red fro m
wage cuts, welfare reduction, and lay-offs and thereby equalized with peas-
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TABLE 14. RURAL AND URBAN PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME (yuan)














Source: ZGTJNJ 1997, p.293.
TABLE 15. RURAL-URBAN NUTRITIONAL INEQUALITIES (per capita consumption kg)
1981 1985 1990 1995 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Graina 178 145 209 135 215 131 211 97
Vegetable 124 152 131 144 134 139 104 116
Edible oil 3.1 4.8 4.0 5.8 5.2 6.4 5.8 7.1
Meat, Poultry 9.4 20.5 12.0 22.0 12.6 25.2 13.1 23.6
Eggs 1.2 5.2 2.0 6.8 2.4 7.2 3.2 9.7
Fish, Shrimp 1.3 7.3 1.6 7.1 2.1 7.7 3.1 9.2
Sugar 1.1 2.9 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 1.3 1.7
aRefers to wheat and rice for rural households.
Source: Compiled and computed from the sections on “People’s Livelihood” in SYC 1988, and
ZGTJNJ 1997.
ants in material life. In r e a l i t y, an exactly opposite phenomenon was
observed.
Rural-urban income inequality has been directly responsible for ru r a l -
urban nutritional inequality, as shown in Table 15. It is true that, even before
full-scale economic reform was undertaken, urban residents enjoyed much
larger amounts of protein-rich foodstuff. Also, the gap has been narrowing
in a relative term. However, the fact remains more than obvious that China’s
f o o d - p roducing class has been forced — of course, by the state — to con-
sume far less amounts of those food items considered precious. 
The critical answers to this puzzle are presented in Table 16. The amount
of deficit-financing for state enterprises from the state coffer once re a c h e d
almost 20 percent of the total state expenditure. Without the generous bail-
out, an unimaginable number of state enterprises could have gone out of
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TABLE 16. STATE SUBSIDIES FOR URBAN RESIDENTS AND STATE ENTERPRISES (in billion
yuan)
State enterprise deficit subsidya Total price subsidiesb









1986 32.48 (13.9) 25.75 (11.0)
1987 37.64 (15.4) 29.46 (12.0)
1988 44.65 (16.5) 31.68 (11.7)
1989 59.89 (19.7) 37.03 (12.2)
1990 57.89 (16.8) 38.08 (11.0)
1991 51.02 (13.4) 37.38 (9.8)
1992 44.50 (10.1) 32.16 (7.3)
1993 41.13 (7.8) 29.93 (5.7)
1994 36.62 (6.3) 31.45 (5.4)
1995 32.78 (4.8) 36.49 (5.3)
aSubsidies for loss-making state enterprises became a separate budget-accounting item in 1986.
bAll price subsidies for consumers were provided for urban-registered residents only.
Sources: Compiled and computed from the sections on “Public Finance” in S Y C, 1989-90, and
ZGTJNJ, 1991-97.
business and left their employees stripped of job, wage, pension, and wel-
fare, and even most of the remaining enterprises could have confronted seri-
ous problems in maintaining adequate employment conditions. Conversely,
the hopeless and burdensome policy of deficit-financing for state enterprise
would not have been implemented if it had not been for the urban worker
population economically supported and politically controlled therein. At
least up until the early 1990s, Chinese state enterprises were practically con-
s i d e red as much a welfare institution as a production institution.
Employment in a state enterprise in reality implied a welfare covenant by
the state as well as a work contract with the concerned enterprise.24
Various price subsidies for urban residents constituted an additional and
no less important welfare covenant. When urban consumer prices — in par-
ticular, food prices — were hiking due to the lifted procurement prices for
agricultural produce in the first half of the 1980s, the Chinese government
immediately stepped in with bountiful price subsidies for buttressing the
living standards of urban workers. Even when agricultural pro c u re m e n t
prices remained unchanged thereafter, urban consumer price subsidies were
maintained over 10 percent of the total state expenditure until 1990. Urban
consumer price subsidies (as well as deficit subsidies for state enterprises)
amounted to more than the total military expenditure for most of the 1980s.
The combination of deficit subsidies for state enterprises and urban con-
sumer price subsidies securely underwrote regular urban workers’ job,
wage, welfare benefits (housing and health care in particular), and everyday
f o o d s t u ff and thereby enabled them to maintain and even heighten their
superior material life over that of peasants in an era of predominantly rural-
based economic growth.
In a stark contrast, the Chinese government almost discontinued the basic
grain redistribution policy for poor provinces in the reform period (Chang,
1993). The state support for collective welfare facilities and pr o g r a m s ,
though it had been scant even in the pre - reform period, decreased to an
unnoticeable level. Most of the grassroots government units in rural are a s
such as villagers’ committees (c u n m i n w e i y u a n h u i) and township govern-
ments (xiangzhengfu) either neglected to properly maintain pre-reform wel-
fare facilities and programs or practically shut them down. The fundamen-
tal assumption shared by the central and the local governments is that peas-
ECONOMIC PRIVATISM AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA 49
2 4Lin Justin Yifu presents an economic justification for the sustenance of deficit-making
state enterprises (Lin, Fang, and Zhou, 1996). From his perspective, state enterprises, even
though inefficient, still contribute to augmenting national wealth by producing otherwise
unavailable goods and employing otherwise jobless workers. Thus, until more efficient enter-
prises take over such roles, state enterprises have to be maintained.
ants now as private producers have to rely on self-help, i.e., private means,
to satisfy their material needs. The private family had to entirely replace the
socialist state in welfare provision as far as rural population are concerned.
As not many rural residents belonged to a private family that could provide
such comfortable material security and affluence as were provided by the
state for urban residents, their overall material disadvantages further lagged
behind.
Dual Dualism
In this way, the rural-urban material disparities — perhaps the most criti-
cal “contradiction” of Maoist socialism — were more aggravated than reme-
died by post-Mao reform. An inevitable response of peasants across Chinese
society was to leave villages for new economic opportunities in cities
regardless of whether they were given official permission to do so. Thereby
created was one of the most explosive rural-to-urban migration streams in
human history, which the Chinese authority calls the “floating population”.
Particularly since the mid 1980s (when official migration restrictions were
substantially softened at both origins and destinations of movement),
Chinese cities of all sizes, administrative ranks, and geographic locations
began to be swarmed by rural people with various qualifications, motiva-
tions, and connections, but rarely with advanced arrangements for work (S.
Chang, 1996; Zhou 1996). These peasant migrants have been quite success-
ful in cracking every blind point of the urban economy to their advantage as
peddlers, housemaids, daily to seasonal contract workers, owners of shops
and restaurants, subcontractors, and sometimes major entrepreneurs hiring
regular urban residents. 
H o w e v e r, they have not been able to make any meaningful success in
acquiring full-fledged urban citizenship in terms of legal residence status
(h u k o u) and official job assignment. Many city governments began to sell
urban hukou or the newly invented lanka (blue card; legal residence status
without entitlement to any state subsidies) for prices equivalent to an aver-
age peasant’s income of several years to several decades.25 Although some
baofahu (individuals and households that have become explosively rich)
may afford to purchase urban hukou or lanka, almost all peasant migrants,
including those with purchased residence status, are still excluded from the
state-financed package of subsidized foodstuff, free housing, health care ,
education, guaranteed job, and re t i rement pension explained above. Thus,
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25See K. Zhou (1996, Chapter 6).
peasants’ migration into cities does not fundamentally alter the politically
sustained dualist structure between the self-reliant private economy of peas-
ant households and the state-buttressed urban economy. If any, a sort of
dual dualism is manifested within urban areas as the migrant status of peas-
ants results in various types of social and economic discrimination by the
urban local and the central governments and urban enterprises that are
determined to protect the exclusive employment and welfare benefits of
regular urban residents (e.g., The Peasant-Worker Migration Project Group,
1996). In other words, the state-imposed inequality between regular urban
workers and peasants has been systematically re p roduced, within urban
areas, as the inequality between regular urban workers and peasant-turned
urban migrants.
An interesting result of this discriminatory tendency is that many urban
enterprises try to avoid hiring new workers from burdensome r e g u l a r
urban residents and instead use much cheaper labor of rural migrants
(Zhou, 1996). For these rural migrants usually employed as temporary con-
tract workers, even state enterprises do not have to provide social security
benefits and welfare services. In addition, the bountiful welfare and strong
job security have “aristocratic” (guizuhua) urban workers, who tend to
shun menial, difficult, and/or dangerous work (Zhang, Du, and Li,
1992:110). As a consequence, various sectors and occupations have an expe-
rienced labor shortage, which has been overcome only by re c ruiting ru r a l
migrants. In sum, the discriminatory social citizenship for regular urban res-
idents has ironically facilitated the inflow of rural migrants.
CONCLUSION
Economic reforms in socialist and former socialist countries have required
grassroots to undergo fundamental and drastic changes in the basic condi-
tions of work and family life. Amid the rapid transition from the socialist
collective economy to the market-oriented private economy, people in
increasing numbers have been trapped in a deadlock situation where they
are neither materially protected by the socialist arrangements for uncondi-
tional employment and subsistence, nor functionally integrated into the
new system of market-based division of labor and commodity exchange. In
rural China, this dilemma seems especially problematic for those people
who live in families without sufficient political influence or pro d u c t i o n
assets, who are women or live in woman-headed households, and who do
not have sufficient luck, courage, or talent to transform themselves into suc-
cessful migrant entrepreneurs in cities. The emergence of the economic dis-
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advantages suff e red by these groups has been structurally linked to the
reactivation of the peasant family as an independent, private economic unit
for whose economic activities the state neither exercises direct institutional
c o n t rol nor assumes political re s p o n s i b i l i t y. The fundamental dilemma in
this regard is not that there exist such unfortunate groups but that their cur-
rent material disadvantages do not seem to have any self-corrective mecha-
nisms ensuring an ultimate sharing of others’ wealth. If “growth-with-equi-
ty” is to be achieved in China in the long run, a redistributive social policy
regime will be indispensable.
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